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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1026 (1995)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In paragraph 3 of its resolution 1026 (1995) of 30 November 1995, the Security Council invited the Secretary-General to keep it informed of developments in the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to submit to it as soon as possible reports, containing the necessary information and recommendations, on aspects of the implementation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina as they affected the United Nations, in order to enable the Council to take a decision ensuring an orderly transfer of authority as envisaged in the general framework agreement and the annexes thereto contained in the attachment to document S/1995/999.

2. The most important development since the adoption of the above-mentioned resolution by the Security Council was the Peace Implementation Conference convened in London on 8 and 9 December. On 9 December a document known as "the London conclusions" was adopted by the Conference (S/1995/1029, annex).

3. I addressed the opening session of the Conference. In my statement, I saluted the brilliant diplomacy that had been seen at Dayton and paid tribute to the negotiators who had laid the foundation for the breakthrough that had taken place there. I also paid tribute to the United Nations personnel, military and civilian, who had been killed or suffered injury in order to bring relief and hope to the innocent victims of war. They deserved great credit for their achievements. The United Nations mandate stemmed from the Charter and the resolutions of the Security Council. United Nations elements involved in implementation of the Peace Agreement would be accountable, through the Secretary-General, to the Member States. Within its abilities and the resources provided to it, the United Nations would do all it could to support the Agreement.

4. Subsequently, presentations were made to the Conference by my Special Representative for the Former Yugoslavia, by the Force Commander of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. The

President of the World Bank and a representative of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) also made statements.

5. The present report addresses the following aspects of implementation of the Peace Agreement that affect the United Nations:

(a) The transition from UNPROFOR to the Implementation Force (IFOR) provided for in annex 1-A to the Peace Agreement;

(b) Coordination of the United Nations contribution to implementation of the Peace Agreement;

(c) The United Nations role as regards:

(i) Humanitarian relief and refugees;

(ii) Demining;

(iii) Civilian police;

(iv) Human rights;

(v) Elections;

(vi) Rehabilitation of infrastructure and economic reconstruction.

The report will also touch on the "High Representative" provided for in annex 10 to the Peace Agreement, since both article I.2 of that annex and paragraph 18 of the London conclusions refer to the Security Council in the context of the High Representative's mandate and/or designation.

6. The report will also deal with the future of certain existing United Nations activities, which will either be discontinued or be transferred to other agencies during implementation of the Peace Agreement, namely:

(a) The International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, which was established, under the co-chairmanship of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the President-in-Office of the European Community (as it then was), in London in August 1992;

(b) The functions of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Sarajevo, who was appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 900 (1994);

(c) Monitoring of the no-fly zone and operation of Sarajevo airport;

(d) The functions of the United Nations Peace Forces headquarters (UNPF-HQ) in Zagreb.

II. TRANSITION FROM UNPROFOR TO IFOR

7. In paragraph 1 (a) of article I of the Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement (annex 1-A to the Peace Agreement), the Security Council is invited to authorize Member States or regional organizations or arrangements to establish a multinational military Implementation Force (IFOR), which will be composed of ground, air and maritime units from the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and from non-NATO States. The parties to the Agreement understand and agree that IFOR will begin implementation of the military aspects of the Peace Agreement upon the transfer of authority for the forces deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina from the UNPROFOR Commander to the IFOR Commander. In paragraph 1 (b) of that annex, the parties understand and agree that NATO may establish such a force, which will operate under the authority and subject to the direction and political control of the North Atlantic Council through the NATO chain of command. The modalities of the participation of non-NATO States in IFOR are to be agreed between those States and NATO.

8. An authorization by the Security Council and the subsequent establishment of IFOR will have a number of far-reaching implications for the United Nations presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the mandate of UNPROFOR, which, in so far as they can be identified at the present stage, are outlined below. It should be stressed that a number of decisions can be taken only after authorization by the Security Council of the implementation arrangements envisaged in the Peace Agreement and the London conclusions.

9. One of the matters yet to be finalized is the composition of IFOR. I am not therefore in a position to report with certainty which of the UNPROFOR contingents will participate in IFOR and, as a result, how many of the troops currently serving in UNPROFOR will need to be withdrawn from the theatre. However, on the basis of consultations with troop-contributing countries, it can be assumed that the larger part of the UNPROFOR units will transfer to IFOR.

10. Following authorization by the Security Council, arrangements will be made without delay to effect the transfer of authority from UNPROFOR to IFOR, a process that could occur within 96 hours of the Council's decision. The UNPF Force Commander will become the Deputy Commander of IFOR but will retain his UNPF authority during the transitional period and will thus continue to exercise operational control over those UNPROFOR units that do not transfer to IFOR, until their withdrawal from the theatre. The arrangement of having the UNPF Force Commander serve simultaneously as Deputy Commander of IFOR will, inter alia, facilitate the coordination of the withdrawal of UNPROFOR contingents with the arrival of IFOR elements. The repatriation of United Nations military personnel not required by IFOR, including all United Nations military observers, will begin immediately after the transfer of authority.

11. It would be my intention to provide appropriate support to IFOR through the joint use of United Nations-owned equipment or its transfer to IFOR. In this connection, I would make available any assets that are surplus to United Nations requirements, after taking into account the needs of existing operations, as well as the Financial Rules and Regulations of the Organization. In accordance with these Rules, surplus equipment would be disposed of in return for

appropriate payment, taking into account depreciation while the equipment was in United Nations use. My Special Representative and his staff are in consultation with representatives of NATO and other IFOR participants with a view to establishing the extent of their equipment requirements, and matching them with the assets that can be made available from UNPF to facilitate the transfer of authority.

III. UNITED NATIONS ROLE IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CIVILIAN ASPECTS OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT

A. Coordination of the United Nations contribution to the implementation of the Peace Agreement

12. It is my intention to appoint a United Nations official at the assistant secretary-general level to serve in Sarajevo as the United Nations Coordinator. The United Nations Coordinator will be under my authority and will report to me. He or she will, on my behalf, exercise authority over the Commissioner of the International Police Task Force (see sect. III D below) and will coordinate other United Nations activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the same way as my Special Representative does at present. He or she will be the channel by which the International Police Task Force Commissioner will receive advice and guidance from the High Representative. The United Nations Coordinator will maintain a close relationship and liaison with the High Representative and his or her headquarters will be located as close as possible to those of the High Representative. The United Nations Coordinator will have a small office comprising political and legal advisers and information staff.

B. Humanitarian relief and refugees

13. In her statement to the Peace Implementation Conference, the High Commissioner for Refugees welcomed the fact that annex 7 to the Peace Agreement had entrusted her Office with two major tasks: to continue as lead agency in coordinating humanitarian relief assistance and in implementing a plan for the return of refugees and displaced persons.

14. She stated that the humanitarian relief efforts of UNHCR, other United Nations agencies (United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), World Food Programme (WFP), World Health Organization (WHO)), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) would remain crucial during the current winter. However, the aim of UNHCR was to reduce the scale of this work as soon as possible and redirect its efforts to the return of refugees and displaced persons. She hoped that IFOR, like UNPROFOR, would have the capacity to facilitate civilian movements, provide logistic support and share relevant information on security conditions.

15. As regards the return of refugees and displaced persons, numbering 1.2 million inside Bosnia and Herzegovina and 900,000 outside the country, accurate planning was difficult because of uncertainties relating to their wishes, the future security situation and the availability of shelter. Annex 7 rightly left to the persons concerned the choice of whether to return to their

homes of origin or settle elsewhere. The first task of UNHCR was to obtain accurate data on persons' places of origin, their preferred destinations and the availability of accommodation there. It hoped for the cooperation of countries of asylum in obtaining such data, which would also be of benefit to those who were organizing elections in accordance with annex 3 to the Peace Agreement. As regards security, it was important that IFOR should deploy widely, so that it could prevent interference and respond to any "deliberate violence to life or person", in accordance with its functions under annex 1-A to the Peace Agreement. Return would be assisted if the Parties established confidence building measures for minority groups and proclaimed amnesties, except for crimes that fall under the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia. For its part, UNHCR would increase its current protection monitoring activities and would closely cooperate with those engaged in monitoring human rights and with the International Police Task Force provided for in annex II to the Peace Agreement. As for shelter, UNHCR intended to establish a project for urgent house repairs, pending the initiation of large-scale reconstruction by the World Bank and others.

16. The High Commissioner also underlined the importance of return movements taking place in an organized and phased manner, in order to avoid destabilizing what was still a fragile peace. Initially the priority of UNHCR would be to ease the congestion in collection centres in both entities and to implement a programme for the return of professional talents, in cooperation with the International Organization for Migration (IOM). UNHCR was also ready to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of refugees from countries of asylum when private accommodation existed for them. UNHCR was grateful for the temporary protection extended in Europe and elsewhere to refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina. The need for such protection was, it was to be hoped, close to an end. It would be important that those benefiting from temporary protection should be adequately informed about arrangements for voluntary return.

17. I fully endorse the High Commissioner's approach to the vital tasks entrusted to her. She has informed me that she will be convening on 16 January 1996 a special meeting of the Humanitarian Issues Working Group of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia.

C. Demining

18. I understand that IFOR will not undertake any demining activity in theatre during its deployment, except where this is required for its own operational purposes. The Mine Action Centre at UNPF-HQ has accumulated a wealth of information as a result of its mines information networks for both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. The continuity of these networks and databases must be maintained until arrangements have been made for future demining in both countries. Any such programme would need access to this information, and it is essential to record the changes that are likely to take place during the period of IFOR's deployment. I therefore propose that four military mines information officers should remain for the time being in Bosnia and Herzegovina to maintain accurate and up-to-date records under the direction of the United Nations

Coordinator. In addition, the Mine Action Centre at UNPF-HQ (one civilian and six military personnel), which maintains the database for both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, would be maintained there pending decisions on the future of that headquarters (see paras. 43 to 45 below). The mines information officers would be part of the United Nations Coordinator's Office but would be colocated with the International Police Task Force headquarters in various parts of the country. The United Nations Coordinator would arrange for their functions and information to be transferred in due course to those responsible for rehabilitation and reconstruction.

D. Civilian police

19. In annex 11 to the Peace Agreement the parties request that the United Nations establish, by decision of the Security Council, as a United Nations civilian police operation, a United Nations International Police Task Force to carry out, throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, a programme of assistance, which is described in article III of that annex.

20. The tasks enumerated in article III include:

(a) Monitoring, observing and inspecting law enforcement activities and facilities, including associated judicial organizations, structures and proceedings;

(b) Advising law enforcement personnel and forces;

(c) Training law enforcement personnel;

(d) Facilitating, within the International Police Task Force mission of assistance, the parties' law enforcement activities;

(e) Assessing threats to public order and advising on the capability of law enforcement agencies to deal with such threats;

(f) Advising government authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina on the organization of effective civilian law enforcement agencies;

(g) Assisting by accompanying the parties' law enforcement personnel as they carry out their responsibilities, as the Task Force deems appropriate.

In addition, the Task Force is to consider requests from the parties or law enforcement agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina for assistance, with priority being given to assisting the parties in carrying out their responsibility to ensure the existence of conditions for free and fair elections, including the protection of international personnel in Bosnia and Herzegovina in connection with the elections provided for in annex 3 to the Peace Agreement.

21. Following the adoption of resolution 1026 (1995), I sent to Bosnia and Herzegovina a police reconnaissance mission, which included the current Police Commissioner of UNPF, two of his predecessors and a member of the Civilian

Police Unit of the Department of Peace-keeping Operations. The mission conducted its work with the full cooperation of the parties.

22. According to information provided to this reconnaissance mission, there is a total of 44,750 active police officers in the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Of these, 32,750 belong to the Federation, 3,000 of them being deployed in areas controlled by the Bosnian Croat authorities. The "Republika Srpska" has 12,000 police officers. The Government in Sarajevo indicated that, as a result of the war, the present number of police was three times the normal strength, and a reduction in their numbers was expected once conditions normalized. At the same time the Government expressed concern that young demobilized soldiers facing unemployment could turn to crime or seek revenge for lost family members and/or property. The high number of weapons in the country was also a matter of great concern.

23. These concerns were echoed by the authorities of the Republika Srpska who also expressed strong concern about the consequences of the Peace Agreement's provision for the Serb part of Sarajevo to pass under the control of the Federation. Approximately 1,000 Serb police officers are working in these areas and there is great apprehension that the transfer to Federation authority might cause an exodus of the majority of the Serb population in Sarajevo or even a renewal of fighting. Similar concerns were expressed at the Peace Implementation Conference in London. The Chief of Mission of UNPROFOR is using his good offices to try to ensure that the Serb population is reassured about the manner in which the transfer will be effected.

24. On the basis of the above assessment, and bearing in mind the nature of the tasks to be performed, I recommend that the International Police Task Force be structured as follows:

(a) A main headquarters in Sarajevo, headed by a Police Commissioner who will report to the United Nations Coordinator;

(b) Five regional headquarters located in Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Gornji Vakuf, Mostar and Tuzla;

(c) Seventeen central police districts;

(d) One hundred nine police stations.

25. The central headquarters and regional headquarters should, where possible, be colocated with IFOR headquarters. The locations of the regional headquarters and district offices correspond with the central headquarters of the local police authorities and with the locations of other law enforcement bodies. The location of the International Police Task Force stations will similarly correspond with that of local police stations in the municipalities, subject to possible change after further reconnaissance by the Task Force Commissioner.

26. This structure would permit the monitoring, observing and inspecting of law enforcement activities and facilities throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the basis of a ratio of 1 monitor to 30 local police officers and taking into account the need to monitor parts of the judicial and prison systems, the

recommended civilian police structure, including supervisory personnel at all locations, would require a total of 1,721 police monitors. It may be possible to reduce the ratio if there is an early return to prewar conditions. The number of monitors required would also fall if there was a post-war reduction in the number of local police officers.

27. While International Police Task Force monitors may be involved in local mediation if conflicts arise as a result of actions by local police, the Task Force will not exercise any executive law enforcement functions. Its effectiveness will depend, to an important extent, on the willingness of the parties to cooperate with it in accordance with article IV of annex 11 to the Peace Agreement.

28. Given the widespread availability to the population of long arms and even heavier weapons, I have given consideration to the possibility of arming the International Police Task Force monitors. The traditional side-arms carried by police officers would, however, be no match for the type of weapons likely to be at the disposal of those who might threaten the monitors. The security of the Task Force must flow from the authority granted to it by all parties under the Agreement and from the fact that its personnel represent no threat to any armed element in that area of operation. I strongly recommend, therefore, that the Task Force monitors should not be armed.

29. The representatives of the two Entities have reiterated to the reconnaissance mission their willingness to provide the necessary security for International Police Task Force police monitors. This is as it should be, but the security of the civilian police monitors, especially during the early stages of the mission, will depend on appropriate arrangements with IFOR and on the effectiveness of the provisions of article V of annex 11 to the Peace Agreement. For these reasons, I recommend that the mandate of the International Police Task Force be coterminous with that of IFOR.

30. The tasks enumerated in paragraph 20 above require that the International Police Task Force monitors have at least eight years experience in such areas as law enforcement and crime investigation. As some of the functions envisaged in annex 11 to the Peace Agreement go beyond those usually attributed to United Nations Civilian Police, it will be necessary to assign approximately 45 civil affairs and public information officers to the central headquarters in Sarajevo, as well as to the regional and district headquarters. These officers, who would be in addition to the police monitors recommended in paragraph 26 above, would keep contact with political representatives of the parties. They would report to the United Nations Coordinator and provide advice on political, human rights and other matters to the police monitors in their areas of deployment. To the extent possible, they would be recruited from officers currently employed by UNCRO and UNPROFOR, in order to retain their experience, expertise and local contacts.

E. Human rights

31. In article XIII of annex 6 to the Peace Agreement, the parties invite a number of organizations to monitor the human rights situation in Bosnia and

Herzegovina. In addition, organizations involved in implementing various other civilian aspects of the agreement will be in a position to obtain relevant information in this regard. It is therefore important that there should be effective coordination of efforts, in order to avoid different institutions adopting different approaches and methodologies. I therefore welcome the agreement of the Peace Implementation Conference that the High Representative or his representative should chair a human rights task force in Sarajevo, which will bring together all organizations and agencies involved in implementation of the Peace Agreement (S/1995/1029, annex, para. 33).

32. The contribution of the United Nations in the human rights field will come from three different sources. First, there will be the human rights content in the UNHCR mandate to provide protection to newly returned refugees. Secondly, the International Police Task Force will have a key role as a result of its mandate to monitor the local security forces' respect for human rights. Thirdly, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has, as he informed the Peace Implementation Conference, identified three areas in which his Office can contribute valuable experience gained from its existing efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These are:

(a) To develop guidelines for, and facilitate, training of personnel charged with human rights monitoring or other activities related to human rights;

(b) To make available to the High Representative a limited number of experienced and trained human rights officers to deal with violations which, because of their complexity, require in-depth human rights knowledge and field experience;

(c) To continue to support the work of the Special Rapporteur and of the Expert on the special process dealing with missing persons in the Former Yugoslavia, both of them appointed by the Commission on Human Rights.

33. As regards the wish of the Peace Implementation Conference that "resources should be provided by ... the United Nations for human rights monitoring" (S/1995/1029, annex, para. 32), I have to stress that the activities described above will need to be financed by Member States and that, unless the General Assembly takes the necessary decision, there are no resources available to the United Nations from which additional human rights activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina could be funded.

F. Elections

34. Annex 3 to the Peace Agreement entrusts to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) responsibility for the electoral aspects of the Agreement. I have informed the Secretary-General of OSCE that the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, in his capacity as United Nations Focal Point for Electoral Assistance Activities, will be ready to make available to OSCE technical advice based on the United Nations extensive experience in providing such assistance in recent years.

G. Rehabilitation of infrastructure and economic reconstruction

35. While the London conclusions make clear that the World Bank and the European Commission will take the lead in international efforts for rehabilitation and reconstruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina, I have no doubt that the specialized agencies and other programmes, funds and offices of the United Nations will be ready to play their usual part in such endeavours.

IV. THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE

36. In article I, paragraph 2 of annex 10 to the Peace Agreement, "the Parties request the designation of a High Representative, to be appointed consistent with relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, to facilitate the Parties' own efforts and to mobilize and, as appropriate, coordinate the activities of the organizations and agencies involved in the civilian aspects of the peace settlement by carrying out, as entrusted by a United Nations Security Council resolution, the tasks set out below." On 8 December, the Peace Implementation Conference in London approved the designation of Mr. Carl Bildt as High Representative and invited the Security Council "to agree Mr. Bildt's designation as High Representative" (S/1995/1029, annex, para. 18).

37. I shall ensure that representatives of United Nations bodies that are involved in Bosnia and Herzegovina in implementation of the civilian aspects of the Peace Agreement cooperate with the High Representative in his coordination functions, which, in accordance with article II, paragraph 1 (c), of annex 10, are to "respect [the] autonomy [of the civilian organizations and agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina] within their spheres of operation while as necessary giving general guidance to them about the impact of their activities on the implementation of the peace settlement". In the same article, the civilian organizations and agencies are requested to assist the High Representative in the execution of his responsibilities by providing all information relevant to their operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

38. Mr. Bildt has pointed out to me that UNPROFOR contains a number of civil affairs and public information officers whose experience with the United Nations in Bosnia and Herzegovina would greatly assist him in carrying out his functions. I share this view and believe it desirable that such of these persons as are not required for the United Nations Coordinator's Office or the International Police Task Force should, if they are so disposed, transfer to the High Representative's office and not leave Bosnia and Herzegovina when UNPROFOR's mandate comes to an end on 31 January 1996. I have accordingly encouraged Mr. Bildt to consider appointing some of them to his own staff, in accordance with article III, paragraph 1 of annex 10 to the Peace Agreement, either on secondment from the United Nations in the case of those who are United Nations staff members or by direct contract in the case of non-United Nations staff members who are working with UNPROFOR on short-term mission contracts.

V. UNITED NATIONS ACTIVITIES WHICH WILL BE DISCONTINUED OR TRANSFERRED

A. International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia

39. It was put to me by the organizers of the Peace Implementation Conference that, as soon as the Peace Agreement had been signed on 14 December 1995 and the necessary arrangements were in place for its implementation, it would be appropriate to dissolve the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and its Steering Committee, both of which bodies have been co-chaired by the Presidency of the European Union and the United Nations since their establishment in 1992. The International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia Mission on the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and such of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia working groups as were still required, would continue their work, with their present terms of reference, reporting to the High Representative. I accepted this proposal and it has been agreed that it should come into effect not later than 31 January 1996. I have accordingly extended until that date the appointment of Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg as United Nations Co-Chairman of the Steering Committee. I take this opportunity to pay tribute to Mr. Stoltenberg and to his predecessor, Mr. Cyrus Vance, for their tireless contributions to the search for peace.

B. United Nations Special Coordinator for Sarajevo

40. In paragraph 3 of its resolution 900 (1994), the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to appoint "a senior civilian official ... to draw up an overall assessment and plan of action ... for the restoration of essential public services in the various opstinas of Sarajevo ... [and] to work to implement the plan." Ambassador William Eagleton (United States of America) was duly appointed Special Coordinator for Sarajevo and has been working indefatigably, in cooperation with the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and under the authority of my Special Representative, to achieve the restoration of public services in Sarajevo. I should like to take this occasion to pay tribute to him and his small staff for their efforts, in adverse conditions, to implement the provisions of resolution 900 (1994).

41. Following consultations with my Special Representative and with the Special Coordinator, I recommend that the office and functions of Special Coordinator be subsumed, with effect from 30 April 1996, in the arrangements to be established by the World Bank, the European Commission and others for rehabilitation and reconstruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Ambassador Eagleton has agreed to remain in office throughout this transitional period, during which he will continue his current projects under the Trust Fund, established pursuant to paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 900 (1994), with a view to ensuring their handover to the appropriate international institutions. I propose that resolution 900 (1994) then be allowed to lapse as of 30 April 1996.

C. Monitoring of the no-fly zone and operation of Sarajevo Airport

42. The Security Council, in its resolutions 781 (1992), 786 (1992) and 816 (1993) established an interdiction on military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina and approved arrangements to monitor and enforce this interdiction, including through the deployment of UNPROFOR military observers at a number of airfields throughout the region. According to paragraph 9 (b) of article VI of annex 1-A to the Peace Agreement, "the IFOR Commander shall have sole authority to establish rules and procedures governing command and control of airspace over Bosnia and Herzegovina ...". I therefore recommend that UNPROFOR's responsibilities concerning the monitoring of the ban on military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina pursuant to Security Council resolution 786 (1992) be discontinued and that the airfield monitors engaged in this task be repatriated. For the same reason, and in view of the handover of UNPROFOR's military responsibilities to IFOR, I recommend that responsibility of UNPROFOR for operating Sarajevo airport pursuant to Security Council resolution 761 (1992), as well as Tuzla airport and other airfields, be transferred to IFOR.

D. United Nations Peace Forces headquarters

43. In a separate report dated 12 December 1995 (S/1995/1028), I have recommended that the civilian aspects of implementation of the Basic Agreement on the region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium should be entrusted to a transitional administrator, under the direction of the Secretary-General and reporting to him, with the military aspects being the responsibility either of a multinational force attached to IFOR or of a United Nations force. As regards the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, my report of 23 November 1995 (S/1995/987) referred to the need to revert to the Council, as soon as practicable, on the establishment of the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) on a fully independent footing, reporting directly to New York. The present report recommends that United Nations activities in implementation of the Peace Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina should be coordinated by a United Nations Coordinator based in Sarajevo. Subject to the Council's decisions on the above recommendations, I believe that the time has now come to wind down UNPF-HQ in Zagreb and to make the three United Nations operations in the former Yugoslavia fully independent of one another.

44. At the same time, it is clear that the process of dismantling elements of UNPROFOR and UNCRO, handing over to IFOR and mounting new civilian operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Croatia, which will be complex and time-consuming, will necessitate the retention of a coordinated civilian and military capacity at UNPF-HQ in Zagreb for at least six months beyond the expiry of the mandates of UNPROFOR and UNCRO. This will require, inter alia, the retention of a small military capacity to guard United Nations premises and assets during the liquidation phase. In view of the quantity, and the high value, of much of the equipment to be guarded, I consider this limited expenditure by the international community to be well worthwhile and recommend its approval by the Security Council. I intend, in the immediate future, to restructure and drastically reduce the civilian and military personnel of UNPF-HQ, including the

Office of my Special Representative, which could be phased out by the end of February 1996. In view of the complex interrelationships between these three missions and all the parties in the mission area, I consider it essential that there continue to be small but adequately staffed United Nations liaison offices in Zagreb and Belgrade. The office in Zagreb should also retain some administrative and procurement capability in order to service the other United Nations missions.

45. I will submit more detailed recommendations on these matters to the Security Council as soon as the latter has taken its decisions regarding implementation of the agreements relating to Bosnia and Herzegovina and to Eastern Slavonia.

VI. OBSERVATIONS

46. As I stated to the Peace Implementation Conference in London, this is a time of hope. The Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina, brilliantly constructed at Dayton, Ohio, on foundations laid during more than three hard years by many peacemakers, but especially by Mr. Cyrus Vance, Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg and Lord Owen, offers real hope of bringing to an end the tragic conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. A similar hope exists in Croatia as a result of the Basic Agreement on Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium. Many speakers at the London Conference drew attention to the interrelationship between these two agreements and to the threat that failure to implement one would present to implementation of the other. Indeed, this linkage was reflected in the London conclusions.

47. I welcome these two agreements because, if the parties will allow them to be implemented, they will end the terrible suffering inflicted on the people of those two Member States for so many years and a major source of instability in Europe will be removed. I also welcome them because of their implications for the United Nations. It is widely held that the United Nations' involvement in the former Yugoslavia has not been a success. I strongly dispute that allegation. The original and primary purpose in deploying United Nations peace-keepers in Bosnia and Herzegovina after war broke out there was to protect humanitarian activities. That mission has been successfully carried out, thanks to the courage and dedication of the civilian workers concerned but also thanks to the protection, logistics support and other services afforded to them by UNPROFOR. UNPROFOR also deserves credit for its successes in negotiating and helping to implement cease-fires and other military arrangements, often of a local nature, without which many people alive today would be dead and material destruction would have been even greater. I also count it a gain that the United Nations, Member States and Secretariat alike, have learnt many lessons in Bosnia and Herzegovina whose benefit will become apparent in our future peacemaking and peace-keeping endeavours.

48. The price for the United Nations has, however, been high. Too many United Nations personnel have been killed or suffered crippling injuries. The conflicts in the former Yugoslavia have dominated the Organization's agenda in the peace and security field in recent years and have distorted its peacemaking and peace-keeping efforts at the expense of other parts of the world. At the

time of peak deployment, in August 1995, the former Yugoslavia accounted for nearly 70 per cent of peace-keepers world wide and over two thirds of peace-keeping costs. I therefore welcome the fact that Member States have decided that the vast task of helping to implement the Peace Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina should not be entrusted to the United Nations alone. Only a cooperative effort between many international organizations and Member States can generate the skills and resources and, above all, the political will required to end the fighting and start building the peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

49. In the present report, as requested by the Security Council, I have set out proposals concerning a variety of ways in which the United Nations can make its contribution to this common effort. The most important of them are in the fields of humanitarian relief and return of refugees, where UNHCR is well placed to continue and develop the work it has been doing from the outset, and civilian police, where the parties have asked the United Nations to deploy a United Nations civilian police force greater than any previously seen. In both cases, I am confident that the United Nations has the ability to perform the tasks assigned to it, provided that the parties cooperate and provided that Member States make available the resources that will be necessary. In the case of UNHCR, that will primarily mean financial resources, voluntarily contributed. In the case of the International Police Task Force, it will mean not only financial resources, which will have to be obtained through assessed contributions if the Force is to be deployed in time, but also human resources in the form of trained and experienced police officers. I urge Member States to respond promptly and generously to these requirements.

50. The present report also covers other areas of activity, notably human rights, where the United Nations can make a contribution to efforts in which other organizations are taking the lead. I am ready to do all I can within existing resources and mandates to provide this kind of support, subject only to respect for the principle that United Nations-staffed and United Nations-funded activities should be accountable to the Member States through the Secretary-General.

51. I shall shortly present to the Security Council, in an addendum to the present report, preliminary cost estimates of the proposals it contains.

52. In closing, I should like to pay tribute, not in a routine way but in heartfelt recognition of dedicated service and sacrifice, to all those men and women who have contributed to the long-delayed birth of hope in the former Yugoslavia and who have risked, and too often given, their lives in the largest peace-keeping operation ever deployed by the United Nations. I pay equal tribute to those who led them - to my Special Representatives Thorvald Stoltenberg, Yasushi Akashi and Kofi Annan and to Force Commanders Satish Nambiar, Lars-Eric Wahlgren, Jean Cot, Bernard de Lapresle and Bernard Janvier. History will confirm that what they and those they led achieved is far greater than they receive credit for in some quarters today.